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NOTES
CAMPBELL v. COMMISSIONER: THE AVAILABILITY OF
BUSINESS EXPENSE OR LOSS DEDUCTIONS FOR
INSURED CONTINGENCIES
INTRODUCTION
John Doe is a taxpayer who runs a warehousing and storage bus-
iness as a sole proprietorship. One day, one of John's employees,
due to a case of mistaken identity, releases the contents of one of
the storage compartments to a person who does not own the goods.
John maintains business liability insurance to protect his opera-
tions from such mistakes. The contents of the compartment cannot
be recovered from the person to whom they were released, and
John's insurer admits liability on the rightful owner's claim against
John for the value of the goods misdelivered. However, for reasons
to be explored later,1 John decides not to pursue the available in-
surance reimbursement and pays the rightful owner's claim for the
value of the goods out of business funds.
This Note explores whether, at the end of the taxable year, John
may deduct the payment to the true owner of the property as ei-
ther a business expense under section 162(a) 2 or a loss relating to
his trade or business under sections 165(a) and (c)(1) .
1. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37, 86-87.
2. I.R.C. § 162(a) states, in pertinent part: "(a) In general.-There shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business.... ." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1986).
3. I.R.C. § 165 states, in pertinent part:
(a) General rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(c) Limitation on losses of individuals.-In the case of an individual, the de-
duction under subsection (a) shall be limited to-
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not con-
nected with a trade or business; and
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On September 22, 1987, the Tax Court decided Campbell v.
Commissioner.4 Presented with an individual taxpayer like John
(3) except as provided in subsection (h), losses of property not connected
with a trade or business or a transaction entered into for profit, if such losses
arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft.
I.R.C. § 165(a), (c) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
In 1964, subsection (c)(3) was amended to provide, in pertinent part, that "[a] loss de-
scribed in this paragraph shall be allowed only to the extent that the amount of loss to such
individual arising from each casualty, or from each theft, exceeds $100." Revenue Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 208(a), 78 Stat. 43 (currently codified at I.R.C. § 165(c)(3)(h)
(Supp. 1986)).
In 1982, Congress struck the above amendment from § 165(c)(3) and in its place inserted
the following: "except as provided in subsection (h)." Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 203(b), 96 Stat. 422 (codified at I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1982 &
Supp. 1986)). The $100 floor was moved to subsection (h)(1), and a new provision was added
to part 2 to subsection (h), which provided that, to be deductible, the aggregate of all per-
sonal casualty losses (after application of the $100 floor) had to exceed 10% of the adjusted
gross income of that individual. Id. § 203(a), 96 Stat. 422 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
165(h)(2)(A)). These changes are effective for tax years beginning after December 31, 1982.
In 1984, subsection (h) was amended to read as follows:
(2) Net casualty loss allowed only to the extent it exceeds 10 percent of ad-
justed gross income.-
(a) In general.-If the personal casualty losses for any taxable year
exceed the personal casualty gains for such taxable year, such losses
shall be allowed for the taxable year only to the extent of the sum of-
(i) the amount of the personal casualty gains for the taxable
year, plus
(ii) so much of such excess as exceeds 10 percent of the ad-
justed gross income of the individual.
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 711(c)(2)(A)(ii), 98 Stat. 943 (codified
at I.R.C. § 165(h) (2)(A) (1982 & Supp. 1986)). These changes are effective for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1983.
Finally, in 1986, Congress added paragraph (E) to subsection (h)(4), which provides: "(E)
Claim required to be filed in certain cases.-Any loss of an individual described in subsec-
tion (c)(3) to the extent covered by insurance shall be taken into account under this section
only if the individual files a timely insurance claim with respect to such loss." Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1004(a), 100 Stat. 2388 (codified at I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(E)
(Supp. 1986)). These changes are effective for losses sustained in tax years beginning after
December 31, 1986.
4. 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 2578 (1987). The Tax Court publishes"'regular" decisions, which re-
present important legal issues. "Memorandum" decisions, on the other hand, involve well-
established legal issues and are not officially published. G. RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAx RE-
SEARCH: GUIDE TO MATERIALS AND TECHNIQUES 69 (3d ed. 1987).
Although Campbell involved a factual determination utilizing the well-established stan-
dard of "ordinary and necessary" under § 162, the court's decision propounded a novel con-
struction of the standard. A question arises, then, as to why the court relegated Campbell to
memorandum status. At least two possibilities exist. The Tax Court might have desired
further case law development in this area before attempting to rule conclusively-perhaps
Campbell v. Commissioner
Doe, who attempted to deduct a payment made by his insured sole
proprietorship, the Tax Court denied the deduction as a business
expense under section 162(a).1 Because the court applied the stan-
dards for evaluating deductibility under the applicable Internal
Revenue Code statutes incorrectly, the effect of the case on the law
in this area is uncertain.
This Note examines the situation presented in Campbell. The
Note uses the case as a starting point to analyze the case law and
relevant Internal Revenue Code statutes, to define and develop the
issues, and to examine the inherent problems that occur when a
taxpayer attempts to take a tax deduction after voluntarily declin-
ing to pursue insurance reimbursement. The Note suggests a com-
prehensive treatment of deductibility in these types of cases as an
alternative to the "all-or-nothing" approach to deductibility that
the courts and Commissioner employ currently."
"ORDINARY AND NECESSARY" IN SECTION 162(A): THE STANDARD
Section 162(a) authorizes the deduction of "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in car-
rying on any trade or business."'7 The seminal case interpreting
this language is the Supreme Court's decision in Welch v.
Helvering5
In Welch, a taxpayer, in an effort to "solidify his credit and
standing" in the grain trade, attempted to pay the debts of the
company that previously had employed him as an officer.9 The
company had gone bankrupt and owed money to customers. In an
attempt to reestablish business relations with these prior clients,10
the taxpayer made substantial payments to satisfy the deficiencies
marking Campbell as a temporary aberration. Alternatively, the decision to assign the case
memorandum status may reflect an attempt to draw as little attention to the dispute as
possible.
5. Id. at 2579-81.
6. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter "the Commissioner"].
7. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). This language dates back to the Revenue Act of
1924, 43 Stat, 253, 269, and has remained largely unchanged to the present day.
8. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
9. Id. at 112.
10. Id.
1989]
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and deducted these amounts as ordinary and necessary expenses of
his grain brokerage business.11
Applying the "necessary" criteria of section 162(a), the Court
stated that "payments to creditors of the [predecessor company]
were necessary for the development of the [taxpayer's] business, at
least in the sense that they were appropriate and helpful. He cer-
tainly thought they were, and we should be slow to override his
judgment."' 2
In Commissioner v. Heininger,i3 the Court reiterated the Welch
standard, stating "the expenses incurred.., can also be assumed
appropriate and helpful, and therefore 'necessary.' """ Later, in
Commissioner v. Tellier,15 the Court elaborated: "Our decisions
have consistently construed the term 'necessary' as imposing only
the minimal requirement that the expense be 'apprbpriate and
helpful' for 'the development of the [taxpayer's] business.'
More recently, the Court reiterated that it would not question the
necessity of reasonable business judgments." The admittedly
"minimal requirement"'18 of the statutory language thus implies
only that the taxpayer believe that the payments made or expenses
incurred were "appropriate and helpful" to the success of his
business. 19
In addition to the "necessary" requirement, section 162(a) also
dictates that business costs must be "ordinary" to be deductible.
The Court in Welch noted that:
Now, what is ordinary, though there must always be a strain of
constancy within it, is none the less a variable affected by time
and place and circumstance. Ordinary... does not mean that
the payments must be habitual or normal in the sense that the
same taxpayer will have to make them often."
11. Id. at 113.
12. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
13. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
14. Id. at 471.
15. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
16. Id. at 689; see also Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93-94 (1952); cf. Kornhauser v.
United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928).
17. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 385 n.18 (1983).
18. 383 U.S. at 689.
19. Id. See also Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
20. 290 U.S. at 113-14.
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Struggling to reify an undefinable intuition, the Court admittedly
articulated a test that was more "a way of life" than "a rule of
law. 2 1
Subsequent cases interpreted the Welch "ordinary and neces-
sary" test as requiring that the expense be "directly related to the
trade or business of the taxpayer. '22 Courts often employ this ar-
ticulation of the test to distinguish business costs from nondeduct-
ible personal expenses.2 3 In yet another variation, the Court has
provided a more concrete articulation of the "ordinary" criteria:
"The principal function of the term 'ordinary' . . . is to clarify the
distinction, often difficult, between those expenses that are cur-
rently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital ex-
penditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the
useful life of the asset. '24 Under this version of the standard, "or-
dinary" expenses are those that do not add to the value or result in
an extension of the useful life of a particular asset.25 In other
words, expenses that do not benefit the business beyond the nor-
mal time frame of annual business operations qualify as
"ordinary. '26
21. Id. at 115. In fact, the Court said: "One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that
will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is
rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply the answer to the riddle." Id. Such
open-ended analysis renders consistent application of the deductibility criteria more crucial.
Although judges may have interpreted Welch differently, prior to Campbell, courts rou-
tinely cited and ostensibly applied the Welch language to evaluate ordinariness. In Camp-
bell, the court failed even to mention this language or to apply 50 years of analysis based on
it, rendering its conclusions highly suspect.
22. See, e.g., Knight-Campbell Music Co. v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir.
1946).
23. See, e.g., Wollesen v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 3293, 3297-98 (1987); Cooper v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. 870, 872-73 (1977); Blaess v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 710, 713-17
(1957); see also Boulder Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (W.D. Okla.
1954) (using Welch language and criteria to distinguish business expenses in the nature of
capital expenditures from personal expenses).
24. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
25. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1987).
26. See, e.g., Fall River Gas Appliance Co. v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 515, 516 (1st Cir.
1965) (a capital expenditure is an expenditure that has a life of more than one year); United
States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (10th Cir. 1957) (an expenditure is in the nature of a
capital outlay if it produces an asset having a useful life in excess of one year). Classic
examples of expenditures that do not benefit the business beyond the normal operational
time frame of one year, resulting in "ordinary" characterization, are: employees' yearly sala-
ries and insurance premium payments for coverage of a year or less. Regarding the ordinari-
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Given the amorphous nature of the "ordinary and necessary"
standard, a court presumably could reach a marginally defensible
conclusion any given way on any set of facts. The inquiries
"[w]hether an expenditure is directly related to a business and
whether it is ordinary and necessary are doubtless pure questions
of fact in most instances. 27 Despite the uncertainty of result, how-
ever, the two terms operate (up until Campbell) in perfect tandem,
with courts assigning no analytical weight to the "necessary" prong
of the "ordinary and necessary" standard.28 Many subsequent
cases assigned no weight to the "necessary" language because the
Court in Welch assumed the payments were necessary, thus reduc-
ing the relevant inquiry solely to the ordinariness of the payment.29
The emergence of the necessity prong as a basis for denying de-
ductibility in Campbell was, then, a significant development that
has introduced considerable uncertainty into the interpretation of
section 162.
Campbell v. Commissioner: APPLICATION OF THE ORDINARY AND
NECESSARY STANDARD
The taxpayer in Campbell was the sole proprietor of an actuarial
consulting business. 30 One of the business's clients was an em-
ployee benefit and annuity fund. The taxpayer's business calcu-
lated refunds for the participants in the fund who withdrew from
ness of salary expenditures, see I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses [of] ... any trade or business, including-a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services .. "); regarding the ordi-
nariness of the current portion of insurance premiums, see, e.g., Peters v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 1236, 1242 (1945); Jephson v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1117, 1120 (1938) (both holding
that payment of an insurance premium for coverage in excess of one year could not be fully
expensed in the year paid; rather, only the amount representing the current period's pro
rata portion of the coverage may be deducted currently); see generally Note, Income Tax
Accounting: Business Expense or Capital Outlay, 47 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1934).
27. United States v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943).
28. In no reported case has a court determined business expenses to be ordinary under §
162(a), but denied deductibility of those expenses on the grounds that they were not neces-
sary. 3 Fed. Taxes (P-H) 11,033, 11,102 (1988). Cf. Podems v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 21,
22-23 (1955) (court discussed necessity almost exclusively, but specifically held the expense
in question to be neither ordinary nor necessary).
29. See, e.g., Sam P. Wallingford Grain Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 453, 454 (10th
Cir. 1934).
30. 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 2578, 2578 (1978).
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the investment plan prior to their retirement."' Two of the fund's
participants had exactly the same name; when one of them with-
drew, the taxpayer's firm calculated the paid-in benefits for the
wrong (non-terminating) employee.3 2 As a result, the fund paid
$13,035.45 to the incorrect employee and was unable to recover the
money. 3
The taxpayer's business maintained a $1,000,000 errors and
omissions-type liability insurance policy.34 The policy had a $5,000
deductible, and the coverage would have reimbursed the taxpayer's
business for the amount of the accidental payment, less the de-
ductible.3 5 However, fearing loss of the client fund's business, and
the possibility of increased premiums or policy cancellation, 6 the
firm reimbursed the fund from its own resources instead of claim-
ing the available compensation." On his tax return for that year,
the taxpayer claimed the payment to the fund as a business
expense.38
The Commissioner allowed the amount of the deductible on the
errors and omissions policy as a deduction.3 9 He contended, how-
ever, that the amount of the payment over the deductible amount
did not qualify as a necessary business expense because the tax-
payer elected not to file an insurance claim.40
The Tax Court noted that the issue presented was "a novel one,
for which we find no case directly on point."4" Persuaded by the
Commissioner's assertion that failure to claim reimbursement from
an available fund designed for that purpose precluded the deduc-
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. The parties agreed by stipulation that the money was not recoverable from the
person to whom it had been paid. Id.
34. Id. at 2579.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2580.
37. Id. at 2578-79.
38. Id. at 2579. Under the federal taxation scheme, income and expenses of businesses
organized as sole proprietorships are reflected on the tax returns of the sole proprietors
through incorporation of Schedule C. Profit or (Loss) From Business or Profession, I.R.S.
Publication No. 334, pt. VI, no. 27, at 94 (1987).
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tion of business expenses under section 162(a), the Tax Court de-
nied the deduction.42
Precedent in Campbell
In Campbell, the Commissioner allowed the taxpayer a deduc-
tion for the amount of the insurance policy deductible ($5,000) be-
cause the taxpayer had to pay this amount regardless of whether a
claim was filed, regardless, in fact, of whether insurance coverage
existed at all. In so doing, he conceded that this part of the pay-
ment was ordinary.43 On appeal, the Tax Court accepted the Com-
missioner's finding that the expenditure was ordinary.44 Relying
principally on Heidt v. Commissioner45 and Whitney v. Commis-
sioner,'4 however, the court denied deductibility of the remainder
of the payment ($8,035) on the grounds that this portion was not
"~necessary. 147
In Heidt, the court denied a corporate executive a deduction for
automotive expenses he incurred in connection with his job be-
cause he failed to claim the reimbursement for these expenses
available from his employer.48 This case, however, was clearly dis-
tinguishable from Campbell on its facts, as well as its rationale. In
Heidt, the party willing to reimburse the taxpayer (the employer)
required that the employee incur the expenses for the employer's
benefit.49 In Campbell, on the other hand, the insurer willing to
reimburse was a third party, completely unrelated to the transac-
tion giving rise to the expense. Also, the expense in Campbell was
not incurred to benefit the insurer in any way. 0
42. Id. at 2579-81.
43. Id. at 2579.
44. Id.
45. 274 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1959).
46. 13 T.C. 897 (1949).
47. 56 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2579-80.
48. 274 F.2d at 26-27. The taxpayer claimed the business expense deductions under §
23(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which was the predecessor provision to I.R.C. §
162(a) in the 1986 Code and is identical in its ordinary and necessary language. Id. at 27 n.3.
49. Id. at 26.
50. Moreover, the deduction of expenses has been allowed when the taxpayer has fore-
gone insurance reimbursement and such expenses were deemed unreimburseable "as a prac-
tical matter of fact." I.R.S. Position Rep. (CCH) 1 44,011 (Jan. 8, 1986) (acquiescing in the
decision reached in Kessler v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (P-H) 1095 (1985)). This rare situa-
tion is applicable to Campbell, a case in which the taxpayer could not practicably obtain
1989] Campbell v. Commissioner
Moreover, the rationale underlying Heidt-that the principal-
agent relationship of the parties involved in the transaction cre-
ated the potential for widespread assignment of income5 1 manipu-
lations between the employer and the employee 52 - is inapposite
to the dispute in Campbell. The closeness of the employer-em-
ployee relationship, especially when the employee is also a control-
ling or sole stockholder in the corporation, as well as the wide-
spread and recurring nature of reimbursement transactions
between these types of parties, give rise to significant motive and
opportunity to engage in assignment of income improprieties. The
court in Heidt was thus justifiably concerned with identifying the
appropriate taxpayer authorized to take the deduction for the ex-
penses incurred. This logic was inapplicable in Campbell, however.
The taxpayer and the insurer were unrelated, except for the con-
nection of the insurance contract, a tie neither party was anxious
to see put to use.5 3 No incentive to engage in assignment of income
abuses existed. The parties did not stand to gain anything collec-
tively from an attempt to flout the tax laws, and reduce their over-
insurance reimbursement because of the possibility of business loss, premium increase, or
policy cancellation. 56 T.C.M. (P-H) at 2580. In the Action on Decision, the I.R.S. stated
that it considered Kessler's position to be analogous to that of the taxpayer in Hills v. Com-
missioner, 76 T.C. 484 (1981), a case in which the Commissioner allowed a loss deduction
although insurance reimbursement was available. Because the taxpayers in both Kessler and
Campbell were unable practically to claim reimbursement, the court should have applied
the reasoning of Kessler (and, by extension, Hills), not Heidt, and allowed the deduction.
See IRS Says Deduction OK, Even if Reimbursement Available, 36 TAx'N FOR AcCT. 158
(1986) ("[A] taxpayer who can establish that reimbursement, although nominally available,
is unavailable as a practical matter should be able to deduct out-of-pocket ... business
expenses."). Further, the reasoning of Heidt has not been applied strictly, lessening its prec-
edential value. See, e.g., Neal v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 556, 557 (1981).
51. Assignment of income (or deductions in Campbell) refers to the process by which
related taxpayers attempt to employ various devices (transaction structure, special code sec-
tions) to attribute income to a party who did not earn it (or to enable a party to take a
deduction for which he incurred no economic detriment) to exploit the tax rate and treat-
ment differentials between the two taxpayers and effect a lower overall tax liability for the
two-taxpayer unit. B. BITTKER, 3 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTs T 75
(1981).
52. 274 F.2d at 28.
53. Although most taxpayers carry insurance, they would prefer not to use it; higher pre-
miums or policy cancellations often result from insurance claims. Insurance becomes a last
line of defense and is used sparingly unless the calamity is of such proportion that insol-
vency or bankruptcy may result. Of course, insurance companies are content to write poli-
cies and collect premiums without having policyholders make claims for reimbursement.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
all tax liability. Additionally, the concept of assignment of income
does not fit well in the context of an insurer-insured relationship.
The liability for the expense or loss suffered due to the accident or
casualty belongs to the insured, not the insurer. No assignment of
income or deductions can result when the taxpayer simply elects to
keep that which is already his, pay the expense himself, and claim
his deduction. 4
Similarly, Whitney v. Commissioner" provided little theoretical
support for the court's conclusions. In Whitney, the taxpayer, sole
trustee of a trust established to liquidate a corporation in which he
was a major stockholder, paid a personal injury claim brought
against a trust employee.56 Under Massachusetts law, a trustee was
personally liable to third parties for torts committed by any trust
employee, but also had a right of indemnification against the trust
for any such payments he was required to make.57 Rather than
seek reimbursement, the taxpayer chose to deduct the payment on
his tax return.58 However, the statute he relied on for the deduc-
tion authorization was section 23(e)(1) or (2), the predecessor stat-
ute in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 to section 165(c)(1) and
(2) 51 relating to losses, not business expenses. The court denied the
loss deduction, stating that the payment was reimbursable from
another source. The court, then, engaging in a loss analysis, denied
the deduction by construing the loss statute.60 The words "ordi-
nary and necessary" do not appear anywhere in the opinion.
Whitney stands for the proposition that, on the facts presented,
under the predecessor statute of the modern loss statute embodied
54. When the taxpayer does not claim insurance reimbursement and pays the claim him-
self, he is clearly entitled to a deduction based on all assignment-of-income criteria. The
taxpayer has disbursed money to the client fund to rectify the payment error; he is the
party deserving relief through a tax deduction. To allow any other taxpayer to deduct the
expense Campbell incurred in this situation would violate assignment-of-income principles.
Of course, if the taxpayer chooses to make a claim on his policy, and thus "assign" his
deduction to the insurer through the vehicle of the policy, no impropriety results. Accord-
ingly, an insured taxpayer who decides to keep his deduction has the right to do so, and no
assignment-of-income impropriety results by virtue of his insurance coverage.
55. 13 T.C. 897 (1949).
56. Id. at 897, 899-900.
57. Id. at 900.
58. Id. at 899.
59. I.R.C. § 23(e)(1), (2) (1939).
60. 13 T.C. at 897, 901.
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in section 165(c)(1) and (2), the taxpayer sustained no loss. One of
the most important aspects in Whitney, moreover, is the latent po-
tential for assignment of income or deductions abuse discussed
above. 1 Whitney, therefore, addressed a question closely related
to the issue decided in Heidt; further, both decisions were colored
by the assignment of income abuse potential present. This ques-
tion, however, was totally distinct from the one presented in
Campbell.e2
The Tax Court in Campbell added a new wrinkle to the "ordi-
nary and necessary" inquiry by accepting the characterization of
the expenditure in issue as "ordinary" but not "necessary."6 3 Up
until Campbell, necessity followed from ordinariness; 4 the "neces-
sary" language added nothing specific to the test of deductibility
under section 162(a). The Tax Court departed from more than
fifty years of settled statutory interpretation.
Additionally, the court's analysis of the necessity of the payment
in question did not even mention the traditional articulation of
"necessary" set forth in Welch 65 and applied in later cases,66 that
61. See supra note 51 for the definition of assignment of income. The taxpayer in
Whitney essentially had the ability to choose which of his tax paying "personalities"--the
trust liquidating a company in which he was a major stockholder, or him individu-
ally-would claim the deduction. He attempted to "assign" the deduction to the personality
that would prove the greatest tax savings. However, as was shown above, such assignment of
income abuse potential was not present in Campbell because the insured and insurer were
not so related that the tax savings of one would accrue to the benefit of the other. See supra
notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
62. The Tax Court asserted that the cites to § 23(e)(1) and (2) in Whitney had been
inadvertent and claimed that the court had meant to cite § 23(a)(1) and (3), the "ordinary
and necessary" language relating to business deductions in the predecessor statute to §
162(a) of the 1939 Code. However, the court's analysis had dealt exclusively with the loss
provisions of (e)(1) and (2). Furthermore, the taxpayer's assertions demonstrate that the
basis of deductibility asserted had been the loss provisions, not the expense provisions. The
Campbell court's assertion, then, is highly suspect. See Campbell v. Commissioner, 56
T.C.M. (P-H) 2578, 2579 n.4 (1987).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
64. Cf. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933) (court will assume "necessity," when-
ever expenses are arguably appropriate and helpful to the business).
65. Id.
66. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966); cf. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343
U.S. 90, 93-94 (1952) ("Necessity" to be determined in light of the "ways of conduct ...
prevailing in the business world,"(quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 472
(1943)); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 152 (1928) (Pre-Welch case treating the
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the payments be "appropriate and helpful '6 7 in the taxpayer's esti-
mation. 8 The taxpayer in Campbell asserted no claim for reim-
bursement under the policy because he feared a loss of client fund
business to competitors, and cancellation of coverage or increased
policy premiums."' The Tax Court called these allegations "vague"
and purported not to rule on the availability of the deduction if
the taxpayer had made sufficient allegations.70 Yet support for any
section 162 expense deduction probably could not have been made
with greater concreteness. Clearly, the taxpayer met the Welch 71
necessity standard by demonstrating that he thought the busi-
ness's absorption of the expense would be appropriate and helpful.
In rejecting the taxpayer's assertions, the Tax Court essentially
ruled negatively on the question it ostensibly reserved. Because the
court failed to apply the correct standard for evaluating deductibil-
ity under section 162(a), the result it reached is of questionable
credibility.72
POLICY RATIONALES FOR DENYING DEDUCTIBILITY OF Campbell
PAYMENTS: A CRITIQUE
Although the business expenditure in Campbell was directly re-
lated to the business's operation and thus clearly deductible under
the accepted statutory interpretation, the court denied the deduc-
"ordinary and necessary" language as a unified standard, emphasizing the "ordinary"
language).
67. Welch, 290 U.S. at 113.
68. Id.
69. Campbell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 2578, 2580 (1987).
70. Id.
71. 290 U.S. at 113. Had the taxpayer been threatened previously with premium increase
or policy cancellation by its insurer the danger would have appeared more imminent. See
Miller v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 399, 400 n.3 (6th Cir. 1984). However, threats prior to the
assertion of deductibility are not required by the Welch necessity concept.
72. One of the more striking aspects of Campbell is the court's application of Heidt and
Whitney to the fact pattern. The more logical precedent to apply would have been Ken-
tucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1968), which denied a § 162 deduction
claimed by a business when compensation was available. Kentucky Utilities had been over-
ruled, but its position had been reinstated legislatively (at least for individual taxpayers) by
changes in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, enacted shortly before the Campbell decision. The
court's failure to apply or even to mention the position taken in Kentucky Utilities may
stem from its recognition that the analysis in that case (or lack thereof) was flawed. Rather
than reaching for a precedent that was inapposite, however, the court should have ruled in
the taxpayer's favor due to the lack of compelling grounds for denying the deduction.
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tion.73 In effect, the court selected one type of business expense for
special treatment without articulating a principle for drawing a
new line between deductible and nondeductible business expenses.
Absent a principle in tax policy to identify which expenditures re-
ceive this special treatment, all section 162 deductions could con-
ceivably be denied according to the whim of a court.
The Double Dip Justification
The most prevalent tax policy reason asserted to deny deduct-
ibility when a taxpayer pays an insurance claim himself although
insurance compensation is available is the "double-dip" or "wind-
fall" argument. 74 Although not relied on in Campbell,75 this objec-
tion to deductibility has been asserted in cases when insured tax-
payers who paid for property losses themselves sought casualty loss
deductions under section 165.70 The "double-dip" logic operates in
exactly the same manner for section 162 deductions as it does in
the section 165 loss context,77 and may have been an unarticulated
rationale in Campbell.75
The "double-dip" argument asserts that business taxpayers re-
ceive an impermissible and unwarranted double benefit if they can
deduct both the insurance premiums on policies in force and the
amounts of any expenditures they make to satisfy covered claims.79
Adherents to this view argue that a tax deduction is, in essence, a
subsidy, resulting in a transfer of a percentage of the cost of the
deducted item (equal to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate) to the
73. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
74. Miller v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 1984) (Contie, J., dissenting); Hills
v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997, 1008-09 (11th Cir. 1982) (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
75. Nevertheless, the "double-dip" logic may have been an unarticulated rationale in
Campbell. An alternative to the § 162 expense analysis in Campbell is a § 165 loss analysis.
See infra text accompanying notes 110-18. The "double-dip" reasoning applies with equal
force under both § 162 and § 165 due to the similarity of the situations in which a taxpayer
might seek the deduction under one or the other section.
76. 733 F.2d at 409 (Contie, J., dissenting); 691 F.2d at 1008-09 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
77. See infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
78. The applicability of the double-dip reasoning to § 162 cases inheres in the near per-
fect similarity of the situations in which the deduction is sought under either Code section.
In both situations, (1) the taxpayer makes an expenditure of funds (2) for which he could
claim insurance compensation, but does not (3) and then attempts to deduct both the un-
recompensed expenditure and the premium on the applicable insurance policy.
79. 733 F.2d at 409 (Contie, J., dissenting).
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Treasury.s0 If both the cost of the insurance premiums8 and the
cost of reimbursing others on covered claims are deductible, the
taxpayer theoretically could deduct the same cost twice. Propo-
nents of this view would assert that Campbell was correctly
decided.
The "double-dip" argument, however, fundamentally misappre-
hends both the nature of the Campbell-type payments and the op-
eration of insurance coverage in general. Insurance premium pay-
ments are simply a way of securing a third party's willingness to
assume some of the liability for potential claims against the busi-
ness entity. The payments, therefore, are a risk-spreading mecha-
nism designed to encourage the continued financial and opera-
tional stability of the business.82 Clearly, then, premium payments
serve a valuable function for the business, even if it makes no
claims against the underlying policy. The logic of the double-dip,
however, coupled with Campbell's "necessity" concept," would
dictate that if a business makes no claim against the policy, the
expenditure was technically not "necessary" for that year, and is
not deductible. The Tax Code, however, recognizes that insurance
coverage is an ordinary and necessary expense and allows a deduc-
tion for insurance premiums in years when the underlying coverage
remains unused. Although intangible, the benefits to the business
from "unused" insurance coverage are many: the encouragement of
banks to lend money, the incentive for businessmen to place orders
and provide supplies, and the encouragement of individuals to ac-
cept employment based on the stability and security provided by
80. 691 F.2d at 1009 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
81. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1981). "Insurance premiums
are deductible as 'ordinary and necessary business expenses.'" Id. at 1012.
82. See G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW 1 1:3 (2d rev. ed. 1984); G. RICHARDS,
RICHARDS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 2 (5th ed. 1952); see also Group Life and Health Ins.
Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211 (1979) ("The primary elements of an insurance
contract are the spreading and underwriting of a policyholder's risk."); SEC. v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 73 (1959) ("There is no true underwriting of risks, the
one earmark of insurance as it has commonly been conceived .... "); Trustees of the Univ.
of Pa. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 890, 901 (3rd Cir. 1987) ("Insurance policies are risk-
spreading devices. They exist primarily because the stakes of liability to an insured are
greater than they are to the insurer, which can spread the loss across all of its customers.").
83. Campbell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 2578, 2579-81 (1987).
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business insurance. The payment of insurance premiums is thus
"appropriate and helpful" 84 even if the coverage is not used.
Furthermore, the "double-dip" argument is unrealistic. For com-
pelling reasons, businesses often forego insurance reimbursement. 5
Continued claims on an insurance policy cause premiums to in-
crease. The taxpayer, by paying a claim himself, tries to avoid
higher premiums in the future, 6 thus characterizing these pay-
ments as prepaid insurance premiums.7 The taxpayer elects to pay
now instead of later. Although this approach is admittedly more
costly in the short run, it reflects an effort to control long-term
increases in insurance rates.8 8 Courts should recognize that a de-
duction permitted for the payment of a claim represents future
premium increases; the current premium payment represents only
the existing cost of insurance coverage. The fallacy of the double-
dip logic is thus identified: the same dollars of expense are not de-
ducted more than once. A deduction for the self-paid claim would
permit the taxpayer to recover the increase in insurance cost he
would have been able to deduct as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense in later years.
PRACTICAL CONCERNS: DEDUCTIBILITY OF Campbell-TYPE PAYMENTS
Despite the compelling policy reasons for making Campbell-type
payments deductible under section 162(a), practical problems still
remain. Three interrelated practical problems, which must be re-
solved before the policy considerations supporting deductibility
84. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
85. See infra note 88.
86. Axelrod v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 248 (1971) (Fay, J., concurring). Three of the judges
in Axelrod asserted that "[t]he insured individual is frequently compelled to forego the de-
sirable benefits of his insurance coverage in order to avert the otherwise inevitable cancella-
tion of his policy or prohibitive increase of his insurance rates." Id. at 260.
87. Hills v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997, 1004-05 (11th Cir. 1982).
88. Theoretically, payment can be spread over future years, leading to a premium in-
crease that is lower than the increases that the insurance company would have imposed had
the taxpayer claimed on the policy. At the very least, under this option, the rate of premium
increase is determined primarily by the taxpayer, not the insurance company. Admittedly,
the taxpayer gambles that the higher insurance rates he incurred by making the payment
instead of claiming the insurance compensation will be lower than the increase the insur-
ance company would have exacted had he filed a claim. Even if the taxpayer loses the gam-
ble, he will have succeeded in keeping his insurance policy unmarred by claims, lessening
the ever-present possibility of policy cancellation.
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may be given effect, are the useful life of the payment, the future
benefits derived from such payments, and the revenue effects of
permitting deductibility.
Useful Life
When a business makes an expenditure for business property to
be used in the production of income for more than one year, the
Code generally requires capitalization of the payment.89 Any capi-
tal expenditures90 for the acquisition of capital assets are not de-
ductible;9' however, the taxpayer may be able to take a deprecia-
tion or amortization deduction.92 Amortization deductions reflect
an effort to avoid distortion of the taxpayer's income for the taxa-
ble period, and to better match a business entity's income with the
costs incurred to generate that income.93 The problem, then, with
the Campbell-type payment is that despite the validity of the busi-
ness reasons asserted for foregoing insurance reimbursement, the
expenditure benefits future tax periods by keeping insurance pre-
89. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (Supp. 1986), entitled "Capital Expenditures," states: "(a) General
Rule.-No deduction shall be allowed for-(1) Any amount paid out for new buildings or
for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property...
." The term "capitalized" means simply that no deduction against current income is permit-
ted for such expenditures.
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 (as amended in 1987) states: "The following paragraphs of
this section include examples of capital expenditures: (a) The cost of acquisition, construc-
tion, or erection of buildings, machinery and equipment furniture and fixtures, and similar
property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year." Id. (emphasis added).
91. See supra notes 89, 90.
92. No practical difference exists between amortization and depreciation deductions. For
reasons of conventional usage, the former term is applied to deductions involving the wast-
ing of intangible assets (contract rights, patents, franchises, etc.), and the latter term is
applied to parallel deductions regarding the wasting of tangible assets. See B. BITTKER, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 10.1 (1983); Schenk, Depreciation of Intangible
Assets: The Uncertainty of Death and Taxes, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 501, 527 (1967).
93. B. BITTKER, supra note 92, 10.1; see also Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364
U.S. 92, 96 (1960) ("It was the purpose of [the depreciation provisions of the Code] ... and
the regulations to make a meaningful allocation of ... [asset] cost to the tax periods benefit-
ted by the use of the asset."). See generally Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Clear
Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics,
6 VA. TAX REV. 1 (1986) (asserting that the essence of the allowance of depreciation and
amortization deductions is the avoidance of distortion of income). Professor Lee argues,
quite correctly, that the disallowance of any depreciation or amortization deduction for pay-
ments benefitting future periods creates as much, if not more, distortion of income as would
the allowance of a deduction for the payment in full in the year of expenditure. Id. at 40.
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miums lower. The payment has created an intangible asset, not un-
like prepaid insurance. To amortize (deduct) part of this prepaid
asset each year in the future, a reasonable estimate of its useful life
must be established. Making such an estimate is often quite diffi-
cult and arbitrary. 4
Future Benefits Generated by the Payments
A second obstacle to the deductibility of Campbell-type pay-
ments, closely related to the first, is their very nature. Such pay-
ments represent future rather than current insurance costs. Busi-
nesses often fail to claim reimbursement because they fear policy
cancellation or premium increases.9 5 In essence, by absorbing the
expense now, policy premiums will be lower in future years due to
the absence of claims. From this viewpoint, the economic charac-
terization of the payment is clear: although paid to an unrelated
third party, the expenditure is essentially a lump-sum prepaid in-
surance premiumY8
Characterization of the payment as an insurance premium
removes most objections to current, full deductibility.9 7 The Trea-
sury regulations under section 162 specifically identify insurance
94. The Treasury regulations relating to depreciation mandate, as a condition precedent
to an amortization deduction, that the useful life of an intangible asset "be estimated with
reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960); see also Lee, supra
note 93, at 38. On the other hand, some courts allow an amortization deduction even when
the taxpayer cannot establish useful life of an asset, if the taxpayer can establish that the
asset does waste. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1920). The Cohan doctrine
states that, if the taxpayer can establish that expenditures were made that are deductible in
some amount, the court is required to "make as close an approximation as it can" of what
the useful life should be and to allow the deduction. Id. at 544. See Lee, supra note 93, at
39; see also Wisconsin Psychiatric Servs. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 852-53 (1981)
(Cohan approximation of condominium useful life); Joyce v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 13, 15-
16 (1955) (Cohan approximation of depreciation allowance). In part, these two parallel and
contradictory lines of authority suggest the need for a legislative solution to the useful life
problem involved in Campbell-type payments.
95. Campbell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 2578, 2580 (1987).
96. See Hills v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997, 1004-05 (11th Cir. 1982), which first asserted
this theory of the economic reality of Campbell-type payments. Ironically, in this case, the
Commissioner made this assertion.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
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premiums as ordinary and necessary business expenses.9 8 Denying
deductibility in this instance allows the Tax Court to assert its own
arbitrary view of necessity and opens a Pandora's box of frighten-
ing proportions. Deference to business judgment99 is one of the
policies underlying section 162 and the Treasury regulations in this
area. Additionally, the Commissioner does not question the neces-
sity of any other types of payments made as "bona fide" business
expenses within the Welch standard. To permit the Tax Court to
arbitrarily remove the kind of business expenses incurred in
Campbell from the purview of that test and subject them to more
rigorous scrutiny is unjustified.100 Businesses seek to maximize
profits. This goal not only "legitimizes" as necessary all payments
in pursuance of that goal, but also guards against frivolous or
wasteful payments.
Further, important business policy considerations support de-
ductibility in cases like Campbell. Businesses should be en-
couraged to insure. Insurance provides the company, as well as
those with whom it deals, an available fund of reimbursement in
the event of a calamity. Such a fund often means the difference
between solvency and bankruptcy when substantial losses occur.
Forcing businesses to use their insurance coverage for every reim-
bursable loss, however, increases the cost of insurance for every-
one, provides a disincentive for businesses to maintain insurance,
and supplies a reason for insurers to contemplate termination of
many taxpayers' coverage.10 '
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1975). The regulation states: "Among the
items included in business expenses are ... insurance premiums against fire, storm, theft,
accident, or other similar losses in the case of a business." Id.
99. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), in which Justice Cardozo stated that the
payments were necessary because the taxpayer viewed them as "appropriate and helpful" to
his business. He emphasized that the Court "should be slow to override" this judgment. Id.
at 113.
100. Compare I.R.C. § 280G (1982 & Supp. 1986), which provides a mechanism for the
disallowance of certain excessive "golden parachute" payments. Note, however, that specific
statutory authority effects this disallowance.
101. One author has asserted that these effects are of little consequence. The author ar-
gues that businesses are able to self-insure if their coverage is cancelled and will simply pass
the increased cost of higher insurance premiums along to the consumer. Taxpayers also will
be able to claim a higher deduction as a section 162(a) business expense for these expendi-
tures, if premiums increase. Comment, Bartlett v. United States: Deduction of Nonbusiness
Losses not Compensated by Insurance-The Need for a Separate Standard for Individu-
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However, although current statutory language supports full, cur-
rent deductibility for Campbell-type payments, such payments do
secure future benefits to the business. Substantial future benefits
usually indicate a payment is a capital expenditure, for which no
current deduction in excess of the current period's pro rata portion
is allowed. 10 2 The current statutory provisions, then, are inappro-
priate tools to analyze the deductibility of Campbell-type pay-
ments, which possess the hybrid characteristics of current and lim-
ited future benefits.
Revenue Effects and Rationale of Deductibility
The final concern with the deductibility of Campbell-type pay-
ments is the effect on the amount of tax revenue collected. The
revenue effects of allowing the deduction of the "self-insurance"
payment in cases such as Campbell are largely neutral. Viewing
the insured and the insurer, by virtue of the insurance contract
running between them, as an economic unit for purposes of the
expense incurred, the unit's net worth has decreased by an amount
equal to the expense.0 3 The tax system should allow the unit a
deduction for the expense at some point.104 If the deduction is al-
lowed to the insured taxpayer, the insurer's taxable income is in-
creased. The insurer is unable to take a deduction because it pays
no reimbursement to the taxpayer on his policy. Although the tax-
payer takes the deduction and thereby reduces his tax liability, the
insurer is not allowed a deduction, and the Treasury collects the
proper amount of tax.0 5 If, on the other hand, the insured tax-
als, 18 Wzi. & MARY L. REV. 200, 211 (1976). As a matter of policy, this rationalization is
very unsatisfactory. Self-insurance requires businesses to put needed capital out of reach,
putting a severe financial strain on many enterprises. Additionally, for businesses that do
not have the adequate resources to self-insure, policy cancellation forcing this option makes
the overall business operation much riskier and raises the possibility that should a calamity
occur, parties deserving of reimbursement from the business will go uncompensated. Denial
of the deduction sought in cases like Campbell produces no greater revenue than a policy of
allowing the deduction. The government should have no interest in a policy that produces
no benefits and at the same time is saddled with the evils of reducing business decision-
making flexibility and increasing consumer price levels and insurance costs.
102. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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payer claims reimbursement, he will offset this amount against the
expense, and his taxable income will not change. The reimburse-
ment has no tax effect per se, but the taxpayer's income is in-
creased by the amount of the expense because the expense no
longer "shields" any other income; the expense is fully cancelled
out against the amount of reimbursement received. The insurer
will get a deduction for the claim paid to the taxpayer. Again, the
proper amount of tax is collected. The correct amount of tax is
extracted from the economic unit, then, regardless of which party
takes the deduction.106
106. A simple example will illustrate the foregoing assertions. Assume the following. In-
surance Co. ("I") has net taxable income of $1,000,000. Taxpayer ("T") has net taxable
income of $50,000. The deduction at issue is a $10,000 payment, all of which is covered by
T's insurance policy with I. A flat tax of 30% applies to both taxpayers.
The tax that should be collected from the two-taxpayer unit of I and T is:
$ 1,000,000 (I's income)
50,000 (T's income)
- 10,000 (deductible expense)
$ 1,040,000 X 30% = $312,000 (total tax)
If T seeks and obtains reimbursement from I, he must take this money into income,
and he receives an offsetting deduction for his payment of the $10,000 to the claimant:
$ 60,000 (income, including reimbursement)
- 10,000 (deduction for reimbursing the claimant)
$ 50,000 (taxable income) X 30% = $15,000 (tax collected)
I is allowed a deduction for the payment to T on T's policy as a cost of its insurance
operations:
$ 1,000,000 (income)
- 10,000 (reimbursement expense deduction)
$ 990,000 (taxable income) X 30% = $297,000
The total tax collected is $312,000, the proper amount.
Assume now that T does not seek reimbursement from I and deducts the $10,000
payment as a § 162 expense:
$ 50,000 (taxable income)
- 10,000 (deduction for expense of payment)
$ 40,000 (taxable income) X 30% = $12,000
Because T does not seek reimbursement on his policy and I makes no payment to T,
I is not entitled to a deduction:
$ 1,000,000 (taxable income) X 30% = $300,000
1989] Campbell v. Commissioner 453
Additionally, denying Campbell-type deductions may actually
have a negative impact on the revenues. Again, due to compelling
business reasons, many taxpayers would continue to pay claims
themselves even if such payments were not deductible. Other tax-
payers, however, would not pay claims themselves if such pay-
ments were not deductible. Insurance companies could claim de-
ductions for reimbursements to these taxpayers.10 7 As a result,
deductions would shift from the individual taxpayer policyholders
to the insurance companies. For tax years beginning after July 1,
1987, however, the top corporate tax rate of 34% (that would be
applicable to insurance companies) exceeds the top individual tax
rate of 28% (that would be applicable to individuals, and sole pro-
prietorship income, as in Campbell).10 8 The higher top corporate
tax rate will enable insurance companies claiming deductions to
shield more income than individuals claiming the same deductions
due to the lower top individual tax rate. Denying deductibility to
individual taxpayers would encourage increased deductions at the
corporate level and would thus decrease revenues to the
Treasury.109
The total tax collected is again $312,000, the proper amount. Thus, no loss of
revenue occurs if T forgoes reimbursement and claims a deduction.
This example assumes that T and I were subject to an identical tax rate. For tax years
after 1986, however, I's marginal tax rate would exceed T's, causing the Treasury to experi-
ence a loss of revenue if T claims reimbursement and I takes a deduction. See infra note 108
and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying note 106.
108. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986) for the corporate tax structure and I.R.C. §
1(a)-(h) (1982 & Supp. 1986) for individual tax rates (the top marginal tax rate of 28%
(33% with § 1(g)'s 5% surcharge, which phases out) is effective for tax years beginning after
December 31, 1987).
109. Historically, top individual rates have exceeded corporate rates, a fact that helps to
explain the Service's longstanding position. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (1954) for the higher individual
tax rates previously applicable and I.R.C. § 11(b) (1954) for the higher corporate rates previ-
ously applicable. The applicable tax law in Campbell was the law in force for 1982. 56
T.C.M. (P-H) 2578 (1987). Whether the Service will be as aggressive in asserting the ap-
proach articulated in Campbell in later cases arising under post-1986 tax law will be inter-
esting to observe. Regardless of the Service's policies, however, a particular view of the
Campbell dispute is not justifiable under the tax statutes simply because it is productive of
the most revenue.
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AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR DEDUCTIBILITY IN Campbell: SECTION
165
Section 165 and Campbell
An alternative to denying a deduction for Campbell-type pay-
ments as a business expense under section 162 is to allow the de-
duction as a business loss under section 165. The distinction be-
tween losses, governed by section 165, and expenses, governed by
section 162, is found in the "nature and occasion of the expendi-
ture," 110 and was once cryptically described as "self-evident.""'
The distinction is a difficult and confusing one to draw because an
event often displays the characteristics of both categories." 2 The
case law provides little clarification in the way of definite stan-
dards or tests." 3 However, expenses, unlike losses, entail a certain
element of exchange: they are expenditures made in anticipation of
producing business income. Losses, on the other hand, exhibit a
forfeiture flavor, a unilateral relinquishment of something of value,
often involuntarily." 4
Campbell-type payments reflect both expense and loss quali-
ties. 1 5 One could view the payment the taxpayer made to reim-
110. Holt v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 75, 78 (1977).
111. Id.
112. B. BITrFER, supra note 92, 1 12.7.
113. See, e.g., Seufert Bros. v. Lucas, 44 F.2d 528, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1930) (criticizing
Board of Tax Appeals for denying relief when taxpayer claimed an expense rather than a
loss deduction; loss deduction allowed); L. Heller and Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.
1109, 1112, (1949) (taxpayer asserted that a payment was deductible as a business expense
or loss; court declined to label the payment and concluded that, on one or the other ground,
the deduction was permissible); see also 6 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXA-
TION § 25.29 (1988) (asserting that, when trying to distinguish expenses from losses, "Et]he
best approach is to determine the character of the item involved and then to review the
cases, considering the deductions allowable for items of that character.")
114. Compare United States v. Winters, 261 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1958) (cost of liquor used
by lawyer to entertain clients treated as an expense), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959) with
Fuller v. Commissioner, 213 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1954) (cost of liquor confiscated in dry state
treated as a loss). See also Holt, 69 T.C. at 78, in which the court stated that "confiscation
and forfeitures result[] in losses, not expenses"; 7 J. MERT.NS, supra note 113, § 28.37 (argu-
ing that "[m]any items deductible under the heading of expense may be called losses to the
extent that they do not bring in an equivalent consideration in services or property to the
payor.")
115. See, e.g., Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631, 632 (6th Cir. 1968) (taxpayer
asserted that his payment was a loss or an expense).
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burse the client fund and to maintain current insurance rates as a
business expense. However, one could also view the misdirected
payment made by the fund at the taxpayer's direction as a busi-
ness loss because no income was expected from the taxpayer's re-
imbursement of the fund. Section 165 is a viable alternative statu-
tory basis for deduction because the erroneous payment exhibits
loss properties.
Section 165(a) provides a deduction for "any loss sustained dur-
ing the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or oth-
erwise. ' ' 116 Section 165(c) limits deductions by individuals under
subsection (a) to, among other things, "losses incurred in a trade or
business.''11 7 Much of the litigation involving this Code section has
turned on the meaning of the phrase "not compensated for by in-
surance or otherwise." '
The Historical Interpretation of "Not Compensated for by Insur-
ance or Otherwise"
Kentucky Utilities
One of the first cases to interpret the "not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise" language, in a factual situation strikingly
similar to Campbell, was Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn."19 In
that case, the utility sustained damage to a generator as the result
of an accident.'20 The equipment was under warranty and insured
at the time of the accident, but the utility feared an adverse im-
pact on its business relations with the manufacturer or the insurer
if it forced either party to bear the full cost of repairs under the
warranty or insurance policy respectively.' 21 The three parties
agreed in a settlement to share the cost."22 On its tax return, the
utility claimed a deduction for its share of the loss under section
116. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1986). For the text of the statute see supra note 3.
117. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) (1986). For the text of the statute see supra note 2.
118. See, e.g., Kentucky Utilities, 394 F.2d at 633.
119. Id. at 631. For the court's analysis of the § 23(a) (forerunner to § 162(a)) claim the
taxpayer asserted, see id. at 633.
120. Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 250 F. Supp. 265, 269 (W.D. Ky. 1965), afl'd, 394 F.2d
631 (6th Cir. 1968).
121. Id. at 270.
122. Id. The manufacturer bore 44% of the repair cost, the utility paid 30%, and the
insurer contributed 26%.
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23(f), the predecessor statute in the 1939 Code to section 165(a).'
Stating that "when a claim is disputed and a settlement is made,
the amount not recovered is allowable as a loss,' '124 the court de-
nied the deduction because the utility's claim against the insurer
was not in dispute. 125 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. l 6
Some commentators12 regard Kentucky Utilities as "the genesis
of the theory that a taxpayer may not elect to forego an insurance
claim and deduct this loss under Section 165. ' '128
123. The Code section read: "(f) Losses by Corporations. In the case of a corporation,
losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or other-
wise." Kentucky Utils. Co. v. Glenn, 394 F.2d 631, 632 n.1 (6th Cir. 1968) (quoting I.R.C. §
23(f) (1952)).
124. 250 F. Supp. at 269 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 271. In denying the deduction, the court relied on Protzmann v. Commissioner,
276 F.2d 684, 686 (1st Cir. 1960), a bad debt case that did not involve insurance or construe
the loss provisions of the Code.
126. 394 F.2d at 633. The Sixth Circuit relied, however, not on Protzmann, as the district
court had, but on Sam P. Wallingford Grain Corp. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 453 (10th Cir.
1934), a case involving the payment of debts of predecessor corporations. The court in Wal-
lingford asserted the long-established principle "that voluntary payments do not give rise to
losses within the meaning of [§ 23(f)]." Id. at 454. The Sixth Circuit cited Wallingford,
however, for the proposition that the loss sustained in Kentucky Utilities "was not an 'un-
insured loss.'" 394 F.2d at 633. That quote, however, does not appear in Wallingford. See
Hills v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 484, 490 n.7 (1981). Furthermore, Wallingford did not in-
volve insurance. Miller v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1984).
127. See Summers, Loss Deductions: The Effect of Failure to File an Insurance Claim
After Hills, 61 TAXES 275, 276 (1983). Another author has described the Kentucky Utilities
holding as follows:
[A]n insured loss is equivalent to one "covered" by insurance .... The impli-
cation of the Kentucky Utilities holding is quite clear .... Because the loss
was not an "uninsured loss," [Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Glenn, 397 F.2d at 633]
by affirming the district court's view that it was not a loss "not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise" [Kentucky Utilities, 250 F. Supp. at 270] the
Sixth Circuit equated "insured" with "compensated." Therefore, if "insured"
is equivalent to "covered," then Kentucky Utilities stands for the proposition
that "covered" is equivalent to "compensated."
Case Comment, Hills v. Commissioner: The Meaning of Compensated for by Insurance in
Internal Revenue Code Section 165(a), 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 513, 519 (1982).
128. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 127, at 276.
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Hills v. Commissioner: Kentucky Utilities Abandoned
In Hills v. Commissioner,'29 the taxpayers' summer home had
been burglarized. 130 The stolen property was insured against theft,
but the taxpayers, fearing policy cancellation, did not claim reim-
bursement from their insurer. They elected instead to deduct the
loss under section 165(c)(3)."s3 Noting that the policy entitled the
taxpayers to reimbursement for vandalism and theft, the Commis-
sioner denied the deduction.132
In its review of prior cases, the Tax Court acknowledged that
this case was the first to "squarely present" the question of
whether "compensated" was equivalent to "covered" under section
165(a).' 33 Relying predominantly on the legislative history of the
section, the accompanying regulations, and the "everyday" use of
the words compensated and covered, the Tax Court determined
that the two words were not synonymous, and allowed the deduc-
129. 76 T.C. 484 (1981).
130. The statute applicable in Hills was the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended
and in effect for 1976. Id. at 485 n.1.
131. Id. at 485. The taxpayers feared policy cancellation because they had claimed reim-
bursement for losses on three previous occasions during a six-year period. All of the prior
thefts had occurred at the summer home. Id.
132. Id. at 486.
133. Id. Prior to Hills, the tax court had flirted with the "compensated means covered"
assertion. In 1971, the Tax Court decided Axelrod v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 248 (1971).
Although one of the questions presented for consideration was whether "compensated"
meant "covered," the majority disposed of the case on other grounds. In a concurring opin-
ion, Judge Quealy, relying heavily on Kentucky Utilities, all but said "compensated" and
"covered" were synonymous. Id. at 260-63 (Quealy, J., concurring). A later Tax Court mem-
orandum opinion, Morgan v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (P-H) 523 (1978), stated explicitly
"'compensated for by insurance' means covered by insurance." In the district courts, the
precedents received similar treatment. In Bartlett v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 216 (D.
Md. 1975), the court accepted the government's argument that "compensated" was
equivalent to "covered," relying heavily on Kentucky Utilities and on Judge Quealy's con-
currence in Axelrod. Finally, in Waxler Towing Co. v. United States, 510 F. Supp.-297 (W.D.
Tenn. 1980) the court denied the section 165(a) loss deduction claimed, stating: "Although
the Code and its interpretive regulations do not specifically state that 'not compensated for'
means 'not covered by' insurance, the case law makes a convincing basis for such a mean-
ing." As this chronology shows, although no cases had faced the issue squarely, by the time
Morgan and Waxler Towing were decided, the proposition that "compensated" and "cov-
ered" were synonyms for the purposes of section 165(a) had gained considerable support in
dictum. Then, the Tax Court decided Hills v. Commissioner.
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tion.13 4 The court rejected the Commissioner's assertion that the
taxpayers only sustained a loss because of their voluntary decision
not to claim insurance reimbursement. In the court's view, the
Commissioner's logic would unjustifiably advantage taxpayers who
decided not to insure. 3 5 Finally, in commenting on prior prece-
134. 76 T.C. at 491-92. The original language of the Revenue Act of 1894 permitted de-
ductions for "losses actually sustained during the year ... and not covered by insurance or
otherwise, and compensated for." Id. at 487. The court asserted that this language had been
altered to eliminate redundancy: all losses compensated by insurance were also necessarily
covered by insurance. The phrase "not compensated for by" conveyed the concepts of ab-
sence of coverage, or nonreceipt of compensation from coverage (the two conditions under
which the deduction was available), and was more efficient. Id.
Further, the court argued that the Treasury Regulations accompanying § 165(a) did not
support the Commissioner's expanded interpretation of the "not compensated for by" lan-
guage. Treasury Regulation § 1.165-1(a) stated that a deduction was available for losses
"sustained during the taxable year and not made good by insurance or some other form of
compensation." Id. Similarly, Treasury Regulation § 1.165-(c)(4), in defining the allowable
loss deduction, provided that "proper adjustment shall be made for any . . . insurance or
other compensation received." Id. at 487-88. These regulations helped to establish that the
actual receipt of reimbursement is the circumstance inconsistent with the allowance of a loss
deduction under section 165. Id. at 488.
Lastly, the court asserted, the "normal, everyday meaning" of compensated was "to pay"
or "to make up for." Id. at 486-87. Thus, to equate "compensated" with "covered" runs
counter to the prevailing meaning of the word "compensated." Id. at 487.
135. Id. The dispute between the Commissioner and the Tax Court warrants further dis-
cussion. In Miller v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1984), the Sixth Circuit, following
the Tax Court's lead in the decision below, allowed an insured taxpayer a § 165 casualty loss
deduction on facts similar to Hills. Judge Contie in Miller, however, disagreed with the Tax
Court's assertion in Hills that an uninsured taxpayer's loss also results from a voluntary
decision-the decision not to insure. The judge stated: "One problem with this argument
[that the loss of a taxpayer who decides not to insure is voluntary] is that § 165 refers only
to the situation as it exists at the time of, and after, the casualty. Events and decisions
preceding the casualty are simply irrelevant." Miller, 733 F.2d at 406 (Contie, J., dissent-
ing). However, this assertion proves too much. If decisions preceding the casualty are irrele-
vant, then the taxpayers' decisions in Miller and Hills to insure, which preceded the casu-
alty, are irrelevant and cannot operate to bar the deduction. A counterargument is that the
procurement of insurance prior to the loss may be considered because its effects continue at
the time of the casualty (i.e., insurance compensation is available). However, this argument
again proves too much. The effects of the decision not to insure also continue at the time of
the casualty-because insurance compensation is unavailable. The insured taxpayer's deci-
sion not to claim reimbursement is, then, no more culpable than the uninsured taxpayer's
decision not to purchase coverage.
As the Eleventh Circuit stated when it considered Hills on appeal: Congress did, indeed,
intend § 165" 'to serve as optional insurance coverage for those who suffer property damage
but who choose to collect from Uncle Sam rather than their insurance company.'" Hills v.
Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997, 1005 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Bartlett v. United States, 397 F.
Supp. 216 (D. Md. 1975) in reaching an opposite conclusion). This observation creates no
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dent, the Tax Court openly rejected Kentucky Utilities."'
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's allow-
ance of the deduction.1 37 At this stage, the Commissioner opposed
the deduction on two grounds.13 8 First, he asserted that the tax-
payers had not sustained a "loss" within section 165.139 Second, he
contended that the economic reality of the failure to pursue insur-
ance compensation had the same effect as if the taxpayers had re-
ceived reimbursement and had immediately given it back to the
insurance company as a premium payment on their coverage.
Characterized as a premium payment, it would be a nondeductible
personal expense.1 40
In rejecting the Commissioner's first contention, the court
adopted a two-part view of section 165 loss situations.' The stat-
ute, said the court, asked two distinct questions: "(1) Was there a
loss?; and (2) Was [the loss] compensated for by insurance or oth-
erwise? ' 142 The Commissioner's position, which implied that the
taxpayer sustained no loss until all avenues of compensation were
exhausted, impermissibly lumped the two inquiries together. The
court insisted that a loss had clearly occurred once the thief had
taken the property. 43 The analysis of the availability of the deduc-
tion then shifts, as the statutory language demands, to whether
compensation was received. 44 To impose a duty to pursue compen-
theoretical inconsistency in the Code because § 165 already serves as alternative insurance
coverage for those taxpayers who do not maintain insurance policies.
136. 76 T.C. at 489-90.
137. Hills v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 997 (11th Cir. 1982).
138. Id. at 999. The Commissioner also revived his argument that the taxpayer's loss was
due to a voluntary election to forego insurance reimbursement, not from the theft. Id. The
court saw this argument as another way to assert that "compensated" meant "covered" in
the context of § 165(a), a contention that it joined the Tax Court in condemning. Id. at
1004. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text, and supra note 135.
139. Hills, 691 F.2d at 1000-04.
140. Id. at 1004-06. See infra note 146.
141. Id. at 1002-04.
142. Id. at 1000.
143. Id. at 1001.
144. Id. The court referred to the inquiry regarding the second, or compensation ques-
tion, as the "compensation phase" of the loss transaction. Id. The wording of § 165(a) and
the accompanying regulations made clear that the importance of the "compensation phase"
was whether reimbursement was received; the fact that compensation could have been re-
ceived had no impact on the deductibility inquiry. Id. at 1000-01 & n.11. See O'Neil &
Thompson, The Compensated versus Covered Casualty Loss Issue-Has it Finally been
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sation, the court held, "would be to run afoul of the clear statutory
language" of section 165.45
The court conceded the economic validity of the Commissioner's
second argument: the money paid by the taxpayer to replace the
stolen items was really a nondeductible insurance premium.'46
However, the court noted that an equally correct assertion would
be made if the Commissioner's argument was turned inside out: all
insurance premiums are really prepaid casualty losses. 47 Yet the
Tax Code, because it contains specific statutory provisions to the
contrary, 14 8 permits neither argument on policy grounds. The
Commissioner's assertion, argued the court, was of no force when
juxtaposed against an explicit, conflicting congressional policy to
allow the deduction of payments in the form of out-of-pocket ex-
penses due to casualty losses, but not in the form of insurance pre-
miums to guard against those losses. Subsequent to Hills, there-
fore, both the Tax Court and the Eleventh Circuit were willing to
allow casualty loss deductions to individual insured taxpayers even
if they made no claim for insurance reimbursement.
Miller v. Commissioner: The Death Knell for Kentucky Utilities
Although Hills weakened the reasoning advanced in Kentucky
Utilities, Miller v. Commissioners49 finally laid it to rest. In Miller,
the taxpayer's insured boat was damaged in an accident. 150 The
taxpayer, who had made four claims in a little over four years on
his three insurance policies covering the boat, his car, and apart-
ment, elected not to file a claim and deducted the damage amount
Resolved?, 16 TAX ADVISER 164, 166 (1985) ("A casualty, however, is a loss; whether it re-
mains a loss is a question of compensation. If a taxpayer has a casualty... at the moment
[the casualty occurs] there is a loss.").
145. Id. at 1001.
146. Id. at 1004. For individual taxpayers, insurance premiums are nondeductible per-
sonal expenditures. I.R.C. § 262 (1986).
147. Hills, 691 F.2d at 1005.
148. Regarding the nondeductibility of insurance premium payments made by an individ-
ual taxpayer not in connection with his business, see supra note 146. Regarding the deduct-
ibility of insurance premium payments made in connection with a taxpayer's business oper-
ations, see supra note 98.
149. Miller v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (P-H) 1565 (1981), af'd, 733 F.2d 399 (6th Cir.
1984). In Miller, the applicable law was the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended and
in effect for 1976. Id. at 1566 n.2.
150. Id. at 1566.
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on his tax return.151 The Commissioner denied the deduction be-
cause the taxpayer failed to claim available reimbursement from
his insurance company. 152
The Commissioner again argued that the "compensated for" lan-
guage in section 165(a) meant "covered by.'1 53 Relying on Hills,
the Tax Court found for the taxpayer.55 The Commissioner ap-
pealed, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. 55
In so doing, the court explicitly overruled its decision in Kentucky
Utilities Co. v. Glenn. 56
The court recognized that Kentucky Utilities could be inter-
preted as asserting either 1) that the taxpayer must exhaust all
possibilities of insurance reimbursement before claiming a section
165(a) "sustained loss," or 2) that the words "not compensated for
by" insurance were meant to be read as "not covered by" insur-
ance.157 The court rejected the first interpretation because such a
reading would render the "not compensated for by" phrase of the
section unnecessary. 58 The court also rejected the second conten-
tion that "compensated for by means covered by"' 59 because the
plain language of the section, its legislative history, and public pol-






154. Id. at 1567.
155. Miller v. Commissioner, 733 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1984).
156. Id. at 404 ("Our decision in Kentucky Utilities is overruled to the extent it is inter-
preted as denying any taxpayer [such as Miller, a § 165(a), (c)(3)] deduction.")
157. Id. at 402.
158. Id. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
159. 733 F.2d at 402. The court stated:
Section 165(a) reflects the intent of Congress that the question of whether a
loss is sustained should be resolved independently of any insurance conse-
quences involved. This conclusion is bolstered by the rule of statutory con-
struction that requires courts to construe the language of a statute so as to
avoid making any word meaningless or superfluous.
Id.
160. Id. at 404. The court cited the same legislative history on which Hills had relied and
asserted that the overriding policy behind § 165's "compensated" language was to deny
double compensation to those taxpayers who had recovered from their insurers. Id. at 403-
04. The dissent launched a three-fold attack on the allowance of the deduction: 1) the tax-
payer's voluntary election to forego insurance compensation severed the causal connection
1989]
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The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Section 165
Statutory changes to section 165 of the Code in the Tax Reform
Act of 198611 ostensibly foreclosed the judicial interpretation
given the section by Miller and Hills. Subsection 165(h)(4)(E) was
added, which provides that "[a]ny loss of an individual described
in subsection (c)(3) [losses of property not connected with a trade
or business] to the extent covered by insurance shall be taken into
account under this section only if the individual files a timely in-
surance claim with respect to such loss. ''162 Thus, for taxpayers in
situations to which this new provision applies, "compensated for
by" insurance does mean "covered by" insurance for purposes of
section 165(a).
In discussing the amendment, the House Committee Report
noted that Miller and Hills allowed individual taxpayers to deduct
losses even when insurance compensation was available if the tax-
payer elected not to claim the reimbursement.6 3 The Committee,
between the loss and the casualty; 2) no loss was sustained because the transaction was not
"closed" (because possibilities of recovery from the insurer still existed); and 3) the major-
ity's holding resulted in preferred tax treatment for businesses. Id. at 405-09. The dissent's
admission that "compensated" does not mean "covered" contradicts the first two conten-
tions; they are simply variants of that assertion. The final argument is undermined by other
sections of the Code that explicitly provide preferential tax treatment for businesses (i.e., §
162, which allows businesses to deduct insurance premiums, although under § 262, individ-
ual taxpayers cannot). See also United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, 103 (1972) (bad debt
characterization case). In Generes, the Court stated:
The Code itself carefully distinguishes between business and nonbusiness
items. It does so, for example, in § 165 with respect to losses .... It gives
particular tax benefits to business losses ... and business expenses, and gives
lesser benefits, or none at all, to nonbusiness losses . . .and nonbusiness ex-
penses. It does this despite the fact that the latter are just as adverse in finan-
cial consequence to the taxpayer as are the former. But this distinction has
been a policy of the income tax structure ever since the Revenue Act of 1916..
• provided differently for trade or business losses than it did for losses sus-
tained [in nonbusiness transactions].
Further, to support the assertion that businesses are unduly preferred under the major-
ity's decision, the dissent relied upon the "double-dip" objection suggested in the Hills dis-
sent. 733 F.2d at 409. This objection however, is without merit; businesses are not doubly
benefitted by the majority's interpretation of § 165. See supra notes 74-88 and accompany-
ing text.
161. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1004(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (codified at
I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(E) (Supp. 1986)).
162. I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(E).
163. H.R. COMM. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 658 (1986).
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however, focused exclusively on "personal casualty losses" that
were "not connected with a trade or business or a transaction en-
tered into for profit.1164 Similarly, when explaining the reasons for
the proposed change in the statute, the Committee recommended
that "[t]he deduction for personal casualty losses should be al-
lowed only when .... [the taxpayer first] mak[es] a claim against
the insurance company."' 65 Finally, the Committee's explanation
of the operation of the new provision stated: "Under the [new sub-
section] a taxpayer is not permitted to deduct a casualty loss for
damages to property not used in a trade or business" unless an
insurance claim is first filed."66 Because of the impact and focus of
these changes, deductibility under section 165 and, at least par-
tially, the Hills/Miller rationale, is still a viable alternative for the
taxpayer in Campbell-type situations.
The statutory changes made by the 1986 Act obviously were di-
rected exclusively at personal casualty losses, or losses claimed
under section 165(c)(3).167 However, because the loss sustained re-
lated directly to his or her business, the taxpayer in a Campbell-
type situation would assert deductibility for his or her payment
under section 165(c)(1), which was left completely untouched by
the statutory changes to section 165(c)(3) that resulted from the
addition of 165(h)(4)(E). Moreover, the court in Miller implied
that its holding allowing the deduction was applicable to business
taxpayers.'68 Congress purported to overrule Miller with the 1986
statutory changes. Yet, these changes affected only the availability
of nonbusiness related casualty loss deductions under section
165(c)(3). The logic of Miller as it relates to taxpayers such as
Campbell, then, is still sound. Further, Miller focused its analysis
on section 165(a) and its "compensated for by" language, not sec-
164. Id.
165. Id. (emphasis added).
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. The court in Miller recognized that the changes made to § 165 by the 1982 amend-
ments of the 1954 code (i.e., addition of 10% floor in § 165(h)) were "designed to limit § 165
deductions for non business taxpayers." Miller, 733 F.2d 399, 409 n.6 (6th Cir. 1984) (em-
phasis added). Because the changes made by the 1986 Act (addition of subparagraph (4)(e)
to subsection (h)) were placed in a subsection dealing exclusively with nonbusiness casualty
losses, then, they, too, operate only to limit deductions for personal casualty losses. See
I.R.C. § 165(h)(1), (2), (3).
168. Miller, 733 F.2d at 401 n.6.
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tion 165(c)(3). Because no statutory changes were made to section
165(a), the Miller interpretation of that subsection is still highly
relevant to the deductibility inquiry.'69 Finally, Congress' failure to
change section 165(a) implicitly ratifies the Hills/Miller analysis as
it applies to business taxpayers. Section 165, then, remains a legiti-
mate statutory alternative under which business taxpayers may
claim deductions for losses covered by insurance.170
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE DENIAL OF DEDUCTIBILITY FOR Campbell
PAYMENTS
Structure of the Alternative
Regardless of whether they are treated as business expenses or
business losses, a basic dilemma emerges when insured taxpayers
make Campbell-type payments. Although the nature of the pay-
ment and its direct connection to the business of the taxpayer sug-
gest current deductibility, the timing of the payment precludes
this treatment. A compromise should be fashioned.' 7 ' Fortunately,
169. See Burke & Friel, Recent Developments in the Taxation of Individuals - Miller v.
Commissioner: The Sixth Circuit Heads for the Hills, 9 THE REV. OF TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS
185-86 (1985). The authors assert:
Miller and Hills may have considerable relevance, for the section they pri-
marily interpreted was Section 165(a), not Section 165(c)(3). These decisions
are thus of interest to taxpayers engaged in trade or business or in a profit-
seeking transaction, who incur losses covered by insurance and who elect for
whatever reason not to seek insurance reimbursement.... [T]hese business or
profit-seeking taxpayers have an assured deduction without having to trust to
the vagaries of [, inter alia, § 162].
Id. at 186.
170. Why the taxpayer in Campbell did not assert deductibility for his payment under §
165 remains a question. The taxpayer apparently argued that because no statutory change
parallel to § 165(h)(4)(E) was imposed on deductions claimed under § 162, he was entitled
to the § 162 deduction. Campbell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 2578, 2580-81 & n.7
(1987). Campbell, however, did not explicitly assert a deduction under § 165(a) and (c)(1).
171. Compromises other than those §§ 174 and 195 employ are possible. One simple solu-
tion would be to allow the taxpayer in Campbell-type situations to capitalize the payment
in an asset account entitled "prepaid insurance premiums," or the like, but not to allow the
deduction of this amount. Under this approach, the taxpayer's benefit would be deferred
until disposition or liquidation of the business. At that point, the asset account would in-
crease the taxpayer's basis in the entity, thus reducing the gain from the transaction.
However, a significant drawback to this and similar approaches is the distortion of income
created by the failure to allocate any of the costs of the payment to the years in which they
are used. See Lee, supra note 93, at 14 (capitalization of the expenditure and its addition to
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the Code itself has provided two model alternatives in section
174,172 dealing with research and experimental expenditures, and
section 195,173 treating start-up business organizational expenses.
The solution sections 174 and 195 suggest is to use the sixty-
month convention those sections employ and modify it on a yearly
basis to provide slightly accelerated deductions in the earlier years
of the five-year amortization period. The amount of the deductible
on the policy would remain deductible in the year payment was
made, as in Campbell. 74 This amount, plus twenty-five percent of
the remainder of the amount of the payment, would be allowed as
a deduction in the first twelve months. Over the next four succes-
sive twelve-month periods, twenty-five percent, twenty percent,
twenty percent, and ten percent of the amount of the original loss,
less the policy deductible recovered in year one, would be deducti-
ble. Application of the proposed scheme would be mandatory. 75
The deductions would be unavailable if the taxpayer did not elect
the special amortization treatment outlined above. The proposed
deduction regime would also include a provision analogous to sec-
tion 195(b)(2), which allows deduction of the balance of the de-
ferred expense created by the amortization rules if the business is
the basis of a long-lived asset, such as the business itself, produces distortion of income if no
amortization is allowed). The compromise solution modeled on §§ 174 and 195 was chosen
because it provides a treatment of the payments in issue more consistent with the overarch-
ing tax policy of preventing distortion of income.
172. Section 174 is an optional provision that allows the taxpayer to treat nonexpensed
research and experimental costs as deferred expenses. "In computing taxable income, such
deferred expenses shall be allowed as a deduction ratably over such period of not less than
60 months as may be selected by the taxpayer. . . ." I.R.C. § 174(b)(1)(C) (1986).
173. Section 195 and § 174 treat start-up expenses alike, with one exception. As a general
rule, start-up expenses are not deductible. However, the taxpayer may elect to amortize
these costs (including costs associated with such activities as investigating the creation or
acquisition of an active trade or business) as deferred expenses:
(b) Election to Amortize
(1) In general.-Start-up expenses may, at the election of the taxpayer, be
treated as deferred expenses. Such deferred expenses shall be allowed as a de-
duction prorated equally over such period of not less than 60 months as may
be selected by the taxpayer....
I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1986). Thus, although § 195 is an optional provision, because the ex-
penses at issue are otherwise nondeductible, a taxpayer must elect this section to secure a
deduction.
174. 56 T.C.M. (P-H) 2578, 2579 (1987).
175. See supra note 173.
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disposed of completely by the taxpayer during the sixty-month
period.17 6
Effects of the Alternative
This proposal strikes a balance between the positions the tax-
payer and the Commissioner asserted in Campbell. The plan ap-
propriately effects an approximately equal division of the tax bur-
den between the Treasury and the taxpayer, although the taxpayer
is favored slightly. Additionally, the revenue effects of the proposal
are neutral. The plan also has the advantage of producing roughly
the same deduction flow that would occur if the taxpayer claimed
the available insurance compensation and the company subse-
quently raised his rates. Further, the policy underlying sections
174 and 195 is consistent with the proposal. One author has ob-
served that the raison d'etre for the approach developed in these
Code sections was to remove the primary bar to deductibility
caused by the inability to determine a reasonable useful life for the
assets created by certain expenditures.7 The alternative suggested
solves the useful life problem with a reasonable assumption. 7  Fi-
nally, the broad theory of the alternative approach has received
overall support in the tax literature. 1 9
176. Section 195(b)(2) (1986) provides:
(2) Dispositions before close of amortization period. In any case in which a
trade or business is completely disposed of by the taxpayer before the end of
the [60 month] period ... any deferred expenses attributable to such trade or
business which were not allowed as a deduction by reason of [§ 195(a)] may be
deducted....
Id.
177. B. BrrKzR, supra note 92, T 12.13.
178. See generally Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1179, 1187-89 (1987) (citing several studies indicating that intangibles such as advertis-
ing, and research and development expenditures "depreciate" at the rate of approximately
20% per year).
179. See Schenk, supra note 92, at 529 ("to properly match income and the expenses
incurred to produce the income, depreciation should be allowed on intangible assets"). See
also Lee, supra note 93, at 32-38. Lee asserts that the proper treatment of costs with useful
lives that, though indeterminable, are known to be substantially in excess of one year is to
treat the expenditure itself as the asset created, and amortize it over some approximation of
its useful life. The treatment of Campbell-type payments proposed by this Note does just
that, and solves the useful life conundrum statutorily by employing a 60-month assumption.
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CONCLUSION
The payment the taxpayer made in Campbell was clearly con-
nected with his actuary business. Consequently, the denial of the
deduction as a business expense under section 162 was erroneous.
The payment is indistinguishable from other ordinary and neces-
sary expenses a business enterprise incurs. The taxpayer made a
business judgment that the long-term interests of the enterprise
would be served best by not claiming insurance reimbursement for
the mistake. The payment was thus necessary within that term's
meaning in section 162. The existence of insurance coverage cannot
change this result. The denial of the deduction in Campbell repre-
sents a far-reaching and fundamentally inconsistent interpretation
and application of section 162.
Alternatively, the money Campbell paid to reimburse the fund
also qualifies for deductibility as a loss under section 165. Again,
the existence of insurance coverage for the contingency cannot
change this result. Based on the detriment suffered if insurance
compensation is not actually received, the deduction should be
available. This interpretation of section 165 allows the taxpayer
himself to determine whether he can claim a casualty loss under
this section whenever a loss has occurred. However, the preserva-
tion of this flexibility is inherent in the statutory structure of sec-
tion 165. Despite statutory changes, section 165 supports the de-
duction asserted by the taxpayer in Campbell.
Yet, although consistent with sections 162 and 165, the allow-
ance of full, current deductibility in Campbell runs afoul of the
Code's core concept of preventing distortion of income by match-
ing income, and the expenses incurred to generate that income, for
a given time period. Campbell-type payments benefit future peri-
ods and the duration of those benefits is uncertain, making the
"useful life" of the intangible asset created by the payment diffi-
cult to determine.
To resolve the tension between these competing tax policies, and
to maintain consistency in the application of section 162, a legisla-
tively-fashioned compromise that would permit the deduction to
be taken over a five-year period is appropriate. The proposed com-
promise not only provides relief for the taxpayer from the eco-
nomic detriment suffered because of the expenditure but also com-
ports with the economic realities of the situation. Although more
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complex than the all-or-nothing approach to deductibility that the
majority of courts have followed, this integrated alternative is pref-
erable to the judiciary's irreconcilable decisions and inconsistent
interpretations of individual Code provisions.
Robert B. Lachenauer
